

Consistency of Strictly Impredicative **NF** *and a little more...*

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Abstract

An instance of Stratified Comprehension

$$\forall x_1 \dots \forall x_n \exists y \forall x (x \in y \leftrightarrow \phi(x, x_1, \dots, x_n))$$

is called *strictly impredicative* iff, under minimal stratification, the type of x is 0. Using the technology of forcing, we prove that the fragment of **NF** based on strictly impredicative Stratified Comprehension is consistent. A crucial part in this proof, namely showing genericity of a certain symmetric filter, is due to Robert Solovay.

As a bonus, our interpretation also satisfies some instances of Stratified Comprehension which are *not* strictly impredicative. For example, it verifies existence of Frege natural numbers.

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Apparently, this is a new subsystem of **NF** shown to be consistent. The consistency question for the whole theory **NF** remains open (since 1937).

Introduction

New Foundations, **NF**, is a system of set theory named after Quine's 1937 article [9] "New foundations for mathematical logic", where it was introduced. The language \mathcal{L}_\in of **NF** is the simple set-theoretic language, i.e. the usual first-order language with the only constants = and \in . The logic is classical first-order with equality. The only non-logical axioms are *Extensionality* and *Stratified Comprehension* as described below.

Extensionality is an axiom

$$\mathbf{Ext} : \quad \forall x \forall y (\forall z (z \in x \leftrightarrow z \in y) \rightarrow x = y).$$

Definition 1 Stratification of a formula φ is an assignment of natural numbers to variables (both free and bound) in φ s.t. every atomic subformula $x = y$ of φ receives an assignment $x^n = y^n$, for some n , and every atomic subformula $x \in y$ of φ receives an assignment $x^m \in y^{m+1}$, for some m . A formula φ is stratified iff there exists a stratification of φ .

Equivalently, a formula is stratified iff it can be obtained from a formula of Simple Type Theory by erasing type indices (and renaming variables if necessary).

Examples. The formula $x \in y \wedge y \in z$ is stratified, but the formula $x \in y \wedge y \in x$ is not.

Stratified Comprehension is an axiom scheme

$$\mathbf{SCA} : \quad \exists y \forall x (x \in y \leftrightarrow \varphi[x]),$$

for every stratified formula φ with y not free in φ .

It is known that **NF** is at least as strong as Simple Type Theory with Infinity, but **NF** is not known to be consistent, relative to any extension of Zermelo-Fränkel Set Theory, which is clearly the main open problem in the area. Despite a number of valiant attempts by a distinguished group of researchers (J. Rosser, E. Specker, R. Jensen, R. Solovay), the question of consistency of **NF** relative to any **ZF**-style set theory has eluded a satisfactory solution for more than 70 years. The problem is undoubtedly very difficult.

That said, there is a wealth of subsystems of **NF** which *are* known to be consistent. Perhaps the most famous of them is **NFU**, so called "NF with Urelements", introduced by Jensen [7, 1969], which results from **NF** by restricting extensionality to non-empty sets. There are also many *extensional* consistent subsystems of **NF**. To start, we mention Hailperin's [4, 1944] result that **NF** is finitely axiomatizable. Quite a lot of research has been done on whether we can prove consistency when keeping full *Extensionality* but restricting **SCA** in various ways. The present paper turned out to be a one in this direction.

In our situation we need to mention Crabbé's [2, 1982] results, who proved consistency of subsystems of **NF** where **SCA** is subjected to certain *predicativity*¹ restrictions:

Definition 2 (Crabbé) *An instance of Stratified Comprehension*

$$\mathbf{SCA} : \quad \exists y \forall x (x \in y \leftrightarrow \varphi[x]), \quad (1)$$

is predicative iff there is a stratification of (1) s.t. the indices of bound variables in φ are $< \text{type}(y)$, and the indices of free variables in φ are $\leq \text{type}(y)$.

NFP is a subsystem of **NF** where **SCA** is restricted to predicative instances. **NFI** ("mildly impredicative") is an extension of **NFP** which allows bound variables in φ of types $\leq \text{type}(y)$.

Theorem 3 ([Crabbé [2]]) *Both NFP and NFI are consistent, where in addition*

$$\begin{aligned} |\mathbf{NFP}| &< |\mathbf{EA}|, \\ |\mathbf{PA}_2| &\leq |\mathbf{NFI}| < |\mathbf{PA}_3|. \end{aligned}$$

[2] gives two kinds of proofs: *model-theoretic* (via countably saturated models) and *proof-theoretic* (via cut-elimination). Holmes [5, 1999] has elaborated on Crabbé's result, showing that **NFI** has exactly the strength of 2nd order arithmetic **PA**₂.

The results of our paper are, in a sense, complementary to Crabbé's:

¹We use this terminology here following M. Crabbé. Not to be confused with *predicativity* in the sense of Feferman, which notion refers to (ordinal) stages of a definition *within the same type*, not ordering *between types* as in Crabbé.

Definition 4 *An instance of Stratified Comprehension*

$$\mathbf{SCA} : \quad \exists y \forall x (x \in y \leftrightarrow \varphi[x]),$$

is strictly impredicative iff there is a stratification of it s.t. the indices of all variables in φ are $\geq \text{type}(y) - 1$.

Let **NFSI** denote a subsystem of **NF** where **SCA** is restricted to strictly impredicative instances. Then:

Theorem 5 **NFSI** (and a little more, e.g. existence of Frege natural numbers) is consistent, too.

The methods we used are *set-theoretic (forcing)* and entirely different from Crabbé's.²

The research presented here is motivated by [1] and continues the line of [12].

Before starting, we have to cite one of the backbones of **NF**-research, due to Specker [10, 1962]. Denoting by **TST** the Simple Type Theory and by **TNT** its counterpart where type indices are allowed to run over all (not only non-negative) integers, we have:

Theorem 6 ([Specker [10]])

1. **NF** is consistent iff there is a model of **TNT** [**TST** is OK] with a type-shifting automorphism σ .
2. **NF** is equiconsistent with the Theory of Types, **TNTA** [**TSTA** is OK], with the Ambiguity scheme, **Amb**,

$$\varphi \leftrightarrow \varphi^+,$$

for all sentences φ . [φ^+ is the result of raising all type indices in φ by 1.]

²Upon circulation of this result M. Crabbé came up with a different (*non-forcing*) proof of consistency of **NFSI**. He observed that when S is any denumerable set and $FC(X)$ denotes the set of all finite and cofinite subsets of X , then the structure $\mathbf{S} := \langle S, FC(S), FC(FC(S)), \dots \rangle$ gives rise to a model of **NFSI**. Crabbé's proof of consistency of **NFSI** alone is simpler (as referee thinks) and uses more elementary means than the one presented here, although the verification that the derived model indeed satisfies **NFSI** is not entirely trivial. It should be pointed out that Crabbé's model does not satisfy the "extras" that our model does, e.g. presented in the Sections 2 and 3.

Proof. See [10]. □

Specker's proof generalizes immediately to subsystems of **NF** where **SCA** is restricted. For **NFSI**, an equivalent Type Theory is **Ext** plus **Amb** plus all instances of

$$\exists y^{i+1} \forall x^i (x \in y \leftrightarrow \varphi[x]),$$

where all indices in φ are $\geq i$.

Notations and abbreviations used in the paper. \mathbb{P} , \mathbb{P}_i and G will be used for fixed partial orderings and a filter, see the beginning of Section 1. We will use the **mathbb** font, as \mathbb{P} and \mathbb{G} , to talk about *any* partial orderings and filters in a given context, see Lemma 9 and further on.

$f: a \mapsto b$ says that f is a function from a to b , and $f: a \overset{\text{bi}}{\mapsto} b$ says that f is a bijection between a and b .

TSTⁿ, **TSTAⁿ** is a subsystem of **TST**, **TSTA**, resp., which allows only indices i satisfying $0 \leq i \leq n$.

1 Consistency of NFSI

From the outset, we assume consistency of **ZFC**. Let $\langle M, \in \rangle$ be an Ehrenfeucht-Mostowski model of **ZF** + **V = L**, i.e. a countable model with a non-trivial external \in -automorphism σ . Without loss of generality we may assume that σ moves up at least one regular cardinal κ (in the sense of M):

Proof: In M , sets can be enumerated by ordinals, i.e. there is a formula $\varphi(x, \alpha)$ s.t. the sentence " φ gives a (class) bijection between **V** and **On**" is true in M . By Ehrenfeucht-Mostowski, $\sigma(x) \neq x$ for some $x \in M$. Since we have a definable bijection, $\sigma(\alpha) \neq \alpha$ for some ordinal $\alpha \in M$. If $\alpha < \sigma(\alpha)$, fine; if not, take σ^{-1} .

In order to move up a cardinal, use a definable bijection $\alpha \mapsto \aleph_\alpha$.

In order to move up a regular cardinal, use a definable injection $\alpha \mapsto \aleph_{\alpha+1}$. □

By default, we will use forcing machinery as laid out in

[8] K. Kunen. **Set Theory. An Introduction to Independence Proofs.** Elsevier, 1980.

Although, strictly speaking, we cannot do it, as the exposition in Kunen [8] is for countable *standard transitive* models, and an Ehrenfeucht-Mostowski

model is certainly *non-standard*, it is well-known that, as far as relative consistency results (which ours are) are concerned, the issue of *standardness* of a ground model M (w.r.t. the universe \mathbf{V}), or "*physical existence*" of a generic filter \mathbb{G} and a model $M[\mathbb{G}]$, is irrelevant, since forcing can be developed entirely syntactically. We take the freedom of utilizing standard forcing results as presented in Kunen [8] for countable standard models with an understanding that, if necessary, our presentation can be done syntactically without mentioning any models.

Given a finite set S of **TSTA**-axioms, let $n \geq 2$ be such that all indices i in S fall under $0 \leq i \leq n$. For $0 \leq i < n$, let $\mathbb{P}_i := \text{Fn}(\sigma^{i+1}(\kappa), 2, \sigma^i(\kappa))$, where

$$\text{Fn}(\kappa_1, 2, \kappa_0) := \{p \mid |p| < \kappa_0 \wedge p \text{ is a function} \wedge \text{dom}(p) \subset \kappa_1 \wedge \text{ran}(p) \subset 2\} \quad (2)$$

(see VII 6.1), and $\mathbb{P} := \mathbb{P}^n := \prod_{0 \leq i < n} \mathbb{P}_i$.

Note first that σ acts as a bijection between $\sigma^i(\kappa)$ and $\sigma^{i+1}(\kappa)$.

Let G_0 be \mathbb{P}_0 -generic over M . Since \mathbb{P}_0 is just the poset which makes $\mathcal{P}(\kappa)$ of the size $\sigma(\kappa)$ in a generic extension, we have

$$M[G_0] \models \exists h_0 h_0 : \sigma(\kappa) \xrightarrow{\text{bi}} \mathcal{P}(\kappa).$$

The coming Definition 7 and Lemma 8 are not necessary for $\text{Consis}(\mathbf{NFSI})$, we could achieve it by working with the original bijection h_0 instead of f_0 to follow; but choosing a "better" bijection f_0 is useful for "bonuses" in Sections 2 and 3.

Definition 7

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_{<\omega}(b) &:= \{a \subset b \mid |a| < \omega\}; \\ \mathcal{P}_{\geq\omega}(b) &:= \{a \subset b \mid |a| \geq \omega\}. \end{aligned}$$

Let $g_0 \in M$ be such that

$$(g_0 : \kappa \xrightarrow{\text{bi}} \mathcal{P}_{<\omega}(\kappa))^M.$$

Defining $g_i := \sigma^i(g_0)$, we get

$$(g_i : \sigma^i(\kappa) \xrightarrow{\text{bi}} \mathcal{P}_{<\omega}(\sigma^i(\kappa)))^M. \quad (3)$$

Lemma 8 *Given $(h_0 : \sigma(\kappa) \xrightarrow{\text{bi}} \mathcal{P}(\kappa))^{M[G_0]}$ and $(g_0 : \kappa \xrightarrow{\text{bi}} \mathcal{P}_{<\omega}(\kappa))^M$, there exists a bijection $(f_0 : \sigma(\kappa) \xrightarrow{\text{bi}} \mathcal{P}(\kappa))^{M[G_0]}$ satisfying $(f_0 \upharpoonright \kappa = g_0)^{M[G_0]}$.*

Proof. Work in $M[G_0]$. Since $|\mathcal{P}(\kappa)| = \sigma(\kappa)$, $|\mathcal{P}_{<\omega}(\kappa)| = \kappa$ and $\mathcal{P}(\kappa) = \mathcal{P}_{<\omega}(\kappa) \cup \mathcal{P}_{\geq\omega}(\kappa)$, we must have $|\mathcal{P}_{\geq\omega}(\kappa)| = \sigma(\kappa)$, i.e. there is a bijection h_1 between $\sigma(\kappa)$ and $\mathcal{P}_{\geq\omega}(\kappa)$. Now, for $a \in \mathcal{P}(\kappa)$, define $f'_0(a)$ by

$$f'_0(a) := \begin{cases} g_0^{-1}(a) & \text{if } a \in \mathcal{P}_{<\omega}(\kappa), \\ \kappa + h_1^{-1}(a) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

We claim that f'_0 is a special bijection between $\mathcal{P}(\kappa)$ and $\sigma(\kappa)$:

(i) $f'_0(a) < \sigma(\kappa)$ is seen from (4) and the fact that $\sigma(\kappa)$ is an additive principal number, i.e. an ordinal closed under ordinal sum;

(ii) f'_0 is onto: if $\alpha < \kappa$, then by the first line of (4) $f'_0(a) = g_0^{-1}(a) = \alpha$ for some $a \in \mathcal{P}_{<\omega}(\kappa)$; otherwise, $\alpha = \kappa + \beta$ for some $\beta < \sigma(\kappa)$, and then $f'_0(a) = \kappa + h_1^{-1}(a)$ for some $a \in \mathcal{P}_{\geq\omega}(\kappa)$;

(iii) f'_0 is 1-1 follows from (4) and the fact that both g_0^{-1} and h_1^{-1} are 1-1;

(iv) further, from the first line of (4) we have $f'_0 \upharpoonright \mathcal{P}_{<\omega}(\kappa) = g_0^{-1}$.

From (i-iv) above, f_0 can be taken as the inverse of f'_0 .

□

Choose $(f_0 : \sigma(\kappa) \xrightarrow{\text{bi}} \mathcal{P}(\kappa))^{M[G_0]}$ as guaranteed by Lemma 8.

Let $\tau \in M^{\mathbb{P}_0}$ be a name for f_0 , so that

$$M[G_0] \models \tau_{G_0} : \sigma(\kappa) \xrightarrow{\text{bi}} \mathcal{P}(\kappa). \quad (5)$$

By the Forcing Theorem VII 3.6

$$\exists p \in G_0 \left(p \Vdash_{\mathbb{P}_0}^* \tau : (\sigma(\kappa))_{\check{\mathbb{P}}_0} \xrightarrow{\text{bi}} \mathcal{P}((\kappa)_{\check{\mathbb{P}}_0}) \right)^M. \quad (6)$$

Taking $p \in G_0$ from (6) and applying σ^i to this formula, we obtain

$$\left(\sigma^i(p) \Vdash_{\mathbb{P}_i}^* \sigma^i(\tau) : (\sigma^{i+1}(\kappa))_{\check{\mathbb{P}}_i} \xrightarrow{\text{bi}} \mathcal{P}((\sigma^i(\kappa))_{\check{\mathbb{P}}_i}) \right)^M. \quad (7)$$

Define $G_{i+1} := \sigma''G_i$, $0 \leq i < n-1$, and $G := \prod_{0 \leq i < n} G_i$. Then each G_i contains $\sigma^i(p)$ and is \mathbb{P}_i -generic over M – see Lemma 9. It's easily verified that G is a filter on $\mathbb{P} = \prod_{0 \leq i < n} \mathbb{P}_i$, but it is less obvious that G is generic (see Theorem 24, not used until proved, the argument is due to R. Solovay). Also observe that $\sigma^i(\tau) \in M^{\mathbb{P}_i}$, for each i .

Lemma 9

\mathbb{G} is \mathbb{P} -generic over $M \iff \sigma''\mathbb{G}$ is $\sigma(\mathbb{P})$ -generic over M .

Proof. "G is a filter in P" being equivalent to "σG is a filter in σ(P)" follows from σ being an isomorphism between P and σ(P). For the "generic" part, it follows from "D is dense in P" ⇔ "σD is dense in σ(P)" (σ isomorphism) and σD = σ(D) (σ ∈-automorphism of M). □

Starting with the complete embeddings $\mathbb{P}_i \mapsto \prod_{0 \leq i < n} \mathbb{P}_i$, define natural embeddings $\iota_i: M^{\mathbb{P}_i} \mapsto M^{\mathbb{P}}$ as in VII 7.12.

Lemma 10 For each i , $0 \leq i < n$, $M[G_i]$ is a transitive submodel of $M[G]$.

Proof. Let $x \in M[G_i]$. Then $x = \rho_{G_i}$ for $\rho \in M^{\mathbb{P}_i}$. Then $\iota_i(\rho) \in M^{\mathbb{P}}$ and $x = \rho_{G_i} = (\iota_i(\rho))_G$ by VII 7.13(a), so that $x \in M[G]$.

Now, assume $x = \rho_{G_i} = (\iota_i(\rho))_G \in M[G_i]$, $y = \tau_G \in M[G]$, $y \in_{M[G]} x$. We need to show $y \in M[G_i]$ and $y \in_{M[G_i]} x$. We compute:

$$\begin{aligned}
y \in_{M[G]} x &\iff \tau_G \in_{M[G]} (\iota_i(\rho))_G \\
&\iff \exists p \in G (\langle \tau, p \rangle \in \iota_i(\rho)) \\
\stackrel{\text{VII 7.12}}{\iff} &\exists p \in G \exists p_i \in G_i \exists \delta \in M^{\mathbb{P}_i} (\langle \delta, p_i \rangle \in \rho \wedge \tau = \iota_i(\delta) \\
&\qquad \qquad \qquad \wedge p = \langle \emptyset, \dots, p_i, \dots, \emptyset \rangle) \\
&\implies y = \delta_{G_i} \in M[G_i] \wedge \delta_{G_i} \in_{M[G_i]} \rho_{G_i}.
\end{aligned}$$

□

See Picture 1.

Interpret variables x^i of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{TST}^n}$ as $x \in \sigma^i(\kappa)$, and interpret $x^i \in^i y^{i+1}$ as $x \in (\sigma^i(\tau))_{G_i}(y)$. First note that from (7) we have

$$M[G_i] \models (\sigma^i(\tau))_{G_i} : \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa) \xrightarrow{\text{bi}} \mathcal{P}(\sigma^i(\kappa)), \quad (8)$$

for each $0 \leq i < n$. For brevity, we denote


$$f_i := (\sigma^i(\tau))_{G_i} \in M[G_i] \stackrel{\text{L. 10}}{\subset} M[G].$$

From Lemma 8, we have

$$f_i \upharpoonright \sigma^i(\kappa) = g_i. \quad (9)$$

Under this interpretation, we want to check all axioms of \mathbf{TSTA}^n in $M[G]$. Since $n \geq 2$ is arbitrary, by Compactness it amounts to checking consistency of the corresponding subsystem of \mathbf{TSTA} .

Let's check *Extensionality*. First observe



Picture 1

Lemma 11

$$M[G] \models \text{Extensionality}.$$

Proof. Follows from VII 2.14. □

We have to model

$$\forall x^{i+1} \forall y^{i+1} (\forall z^i (z \in^i x \leftrightarrow z \in^i y) \rightarrow x = y),$$

i.e. to prove, in $M[G]$,

$$\forall x \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa) \forall y \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa) (\forall z \in \sigma^i(\kappa) (z \in f_i(x) \leftrightarrow z \in f_i(y)) \rightarrow x = y). \quad (10)$$

Fix $x, y \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa)$, and assume

$$\forall z \in \sigma^i(\kappa) (z \in f_i(x) \leftrightarrow z \in f_i(y)). \quad (11)$$

Since $(f_i(x), f_i(y) \in \mathcal{P}(\sigma^i(\kappa)))^{M[G_i]}$, we have $(f_i(x), f_i(y) \subset \sigma^i(\kappa))^{M[G_i]}$, so by absoluteness $f_i(x), f_i(y) \subset \sigma^i(\kappa)$. Then, (11) can be reduced to

$$\forall z (z \in f_i(x) \leftrightarrow z \in f_i(y)), \quad (12)$$

which implies

$$f_i(x) = f_i(y)$$

by *Extensionality* of $M[G]$. Now, since the functions f_i are 1-1 in $M[G_i]$ (see (8)), by absoluteness they are 1-1 in $M[G]$, so we can conclude $x = y$.

For *Ambiguity*, since σ is a bijection between $\sigma^i(\kappa)$ and $\sigma^{i+1}(\kappa)$, it's enough to model

$$\forall x^i \forall y^{i+1} (x \in^i y \leftrightarrow \sigma(x) \in^{i+1} \sigma(y)),$$

i.e. to have, in $M[G]$,

$$\forall x \in \sigma^i(\kappa) \forall y \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa) (x \in f_i(y) \leftrightarrow \sigma(x) \in f_{i+1}(\sigma(y))), \quad (13)$$

$$0 \leq i < n - 1.$$

Lemma 12 For each i , $0 \leq i < n - 1$, there is an \in -isomorphism σ_i of $M[G_i]$ onto $M[G_{i+1}]$ extending $\sigma \upharpoonright M$; additionally, $\sigma_i(f_i) = f_{i+1}$.

Proof. See Lemma 13 – Corollary 17. □

Coming back to (13), fix $x \in \sigma^i(\kappa)$, $y \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa)$. Assume $M[G] \models x \in f_i(y)$ (the opposite direction being analogous). Since the formula " $x \in f_i(y)$ " is Δ_0 , by absoluteness

$$M[G_i] \models x \in f_i(y).$$

By Lemma 12,

$$M[G_{i+1}] \models \sigma(x) \in f_{i+1}(\sigma(y)).$$

By absoluteness again, $M[G] \models \sigma(x) \in f_{i+1}(\sigma(y))$.

In the Lemma 13 – Corollary 17 below \mathbb{P} is one of \mathbb{P}_i 's, $0 \leq i < n - 1$, and \mathbb{G} is \mathbb{P} -generic over M .

Lemma 13 $\sigma: M^{\mathbb{P}} \xrightarrow{\text{bi}} M^{\sigma(\mathbb{P})}$ and σ is an \in -isomorphism between $\langle M^{\mathbb{P}} \times \mathbb{P}, M^{\mathbb{P}} \rangle$ and $\langle M^{\sigma(\mathbb{P})} \times \sigma(\mathbb{P}), M^{\sigma(\mathbb{P})} \rangle$ in the sense that for every $\mu, \tau \in M^{\mathbb{P}}$ and $p \in \mathbb{P}$,

$$\langle \mu, p \rangle \in \tau \leftrightarrow \langle \sigma(\mu), \sigma(p) \rangle \in \sigma(\tau).$$

Proof. $\sigma: M^{\mathbb{P}} \xrightarrow{\text{bi}} M^{\sigma(\mathbb{P})}$ follows from the fact that " $\tau \in M^{\mathbb{P}}$ " is a formula of set theory with parameters τ, \mathbb{P} . \in is preserved since σ is an \in -automorphism of M . \square

Definition 14

$$\Sigma = \{ \langle \tau_{\mathbb{G}}, (\sigma(\tau))_{\sigma''\mathbb{G}} \rangle \mid \tau \in M^{\mathbb{P}} \}.$$

Lemma 15 Σ is an \in -isomorphism between $M[\mathbb{G}]$ and $M[\sigma''\mathbb{G}]$.

Proof. We need to check four things: (a) Σ is a function; (b) Σ is onto; (c) Σ is 1-1; (d) Σ commutes with \in . (b) follows from the fact that $\sigma: M^{\mathbb{P}} \xrightarrow{\text{bi}} M^{\sigma(\mathbb{P})}$ is onto, Lemma 13. (d): Let $\mu_{\mathbb{G}} \in \tau_{\mathbb{G}}$. Then $\exists p \in \mathbb{G} \langle \mu, p \rangle \in \tau$. Then $\sigma(p) \in \sigma''\mathbb{G}$ and $\langle \sigma(\mu), \sigma(p) \rangle \in \sigma(\tau)$ (Lemma 13). This means $(\sigma(\mu))_{\sigma''\mathbb{G}} \in (\sigma(\tau))_{\sigma''\mathbb{G}}$. (a) Let $\tau_{\mathbb{G}} = \tau'_{\mathbb{G}}$. Then $\forall \mu \in M^{\mathbb{P}} (\mu_{\mathbb{G}} \in \tau_{\mathbb{G}} \leftrightarrow \mu_{\mathbb{G}} \in \tau'_{\mathbb{G}})$. By (d) $\forall \mu \in M^{\mathbb{P}} ((\sigma(\mu))_{\sigma''\mathbb{G}} \in (\sigma(\tau))_{\sigma''\mathbb{G}} \leftrightarrow (\sigma(\mu))_{\sigma''\mathbb{G}} \in (\sigma(\tau'))_{\sigma''\mathbb{G}})$. By Lemma 13 this implies $\forall \mu \in M^{\sigma(\mathbb{P})} (\mu_{\sigma''\mathbb{G}} \in (\sigma(\tau))_{\sigma''\mathbb{G}} \leftrightarrow \mu_{\sigma''\mathbb{G}} \in (\sigma(\tau'))_{\sigma''\mathbb{G}})$, i.e. $(\sigma(\tau))_{\sigma''\mathbb{G}} = (\sigma(\tau'))_{\sigma''\mathbb{G}}$. (c) is analogous to (a): Σ^{-1} is a function. \square

Lemma 16 For every $x \in M$, $(x)_{\mathbb{P}}^{\check{}} = (x)_{\sigma(\mathbb{P})}^{\check{}}$ and $\Sigma(x) = \sigma(x)$.

Proof. Since $1_{\mathbb{P}} = 1_{\sigma(\mathbb{P})} = \emptyset$, $(x)_{\mathbb{P}}^{\check{}} = (x)_{\sigma(\mathbb{P})}^{\check{}}$ is proved by induction on x . By Definition 14,

$$\Sigma(x) = \Sigma((\check{x})_{\mathbb{G}}) \stackrel{\text{Def. 14}}{=} (\sigma(\check{x}))_{\sigma''\mathbb{G}} \stackrel{\sigma \in \text{-auto}}{=} ((\sigma(x))^{\check{}})_{\sigma''\mathbb{G}} = \sigma(x).$$

\square

Corollary 17

$$\Sigma \Vdash M = \sigma.$$

This concludes the proof of Lemma 12 and verification of the *Ambiguity* axiom of **TSTA**ⁿ.

For *Comprehension*, we want to model

$$\forall x_1^{i_1} \dots \forall x_k^{i_k} \exists y^{i+1} \forall x^i (x \in^i y \leftrightarrow \varphi(x, x_1, \dots, x_k)).$$

This means to prove, in $M[G]$,

$$\forall x_1 \in \sigma^{i_1}(\kappa) \dots \forall x_k \in \sigma^{i_k}(\kappa) \exists y \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa) \forall x \in \sigma^i(\kappa) (x \in f_i(y) \leftrightarrow \tilde{\varphi}(x, x_1, \dots, x_k, \sigma^{\iota_1}(\kappa), \dots, \sigma^{\iota_\ell}(\kappa), f_{j_1}, \dots, f_{j_i})), \quad (14)$$

where $\tilde{\varphi}$ is a translation of φ by the rules above.

In this interpretation, $M[G]$ does not satisfy (14) for every φ . One trivial result is immediate however from what stands: **Consis(NF₂)**. In that case in (14) $i = j_1 = \dots = j_i$, and the set

$$A := \{x \in \sigma^i(\kappa) \mid \tilde{\varphi}(x, x_1, \dots, x_k, \sigma^{\iota_1}(\kappa), \dots, \sigma^{\iota_\ell}(\kappa), f_{j_1}, \dots, f_{j_i})\} \quad (15)$$

is in $M[G_i]$ by *Separation*; thus, also having $A \subset \sigma^i(\kappa)$, y can be taken to be $f_i^{-1}(A)$.

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In general, everything boils down to showing $A \in M[G_i]$, but if G is not generic, it's even not clear whether A exists as a set in $M[G]$.

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Assume in addition that G is \mathbb{P} -generic over M . Let an instance

$$\forall x_1 \dots \forall x_k \exists y \forall x (x \in y \leftrightarrow \varphi(x, x_1, \dots, x_k)) \quad (16)$$

of *Stratified Comprehension* be *strictly impredicative*. In that case, under our interpretation, (16) is true in $M[G]$. Indeed, it's enough to check only the case $i = 0$, for the general case follows then by *Ambiguity*. If $i = 0$, then $A \in M[G]$ since $M[G] \models$ *Separation*, and actually $A \in M[G_0]$ by VII 6.14 (*forcing above doesn't add subsets of smaller cardinals*).

—

We can do more, even without assuming G being generic or an axiom strictly impredicative. For example, the axioms

P7: $\forall u \exists v \forall x \forall y (\langle y, x \rangle \in u \longleftrightarrow \langle x, y \rangle \in v)$

P8: $\exists v \forall x (x \in v \longleftrightarrow \exists y (x = \{y\}))$

can be pushed through utilizing our careful choice of the initial bijection f_0 as in Lemma 8. See Sections 2 and 3.³

—

What remains now is to show that $G = \prod_{0 \leq i < n} G_i$ is generic over M . This argument is due to R. Solovay. It uses the notion of λ -closedness, the Product Lemma, and the fact VII 6.14 (*forcing above doesn't add subsets of smaller cardinals*):

Lemma 18 (see VII Exercise B5) *Assume $A \in M$, $f : A \mapsto M$ and $f \in M[\mathbb{G}]$. Then there is a $B \in M$ such that $f : A \mapsto B$.*

Proof. Let $f = \tau_{\mathbb{G}}$. We have

$$\forall x \in A \exists! b \in M \langle x, b \rangle \in f;$$

this yields

$$\forall x \in A \exists! b \in M ((\text{op}(\check{x}, \check{b}))_{\mathbb{G}} \in \tau_{\mathbb{G}})^{M[\mathbb{G}]}.$$

By VII 3.6

$$\forall x \in A \exists! b \in M \exists p \in \mathbb{G} (p \Vdash^* \text{op}(\check{x}, \check{b}) \in \tau)^M,$$

implying

$$\forall x \in A \exists! b \in M \exists p \in \mathbb{P} (p \Vdash^* \text{op}(\check{x}, \check{b}) \in \tau)^M,$$

i.e.

$$M \models \forall x \in A \exists! b \exists p \in \mathbb{P} p \Vdash^* \text{op}(\check{x}, \check{b}) \in \tau.$$

By *Replacement* (in M)

$$M \models \exists B = \{b \mid \exists x \in A \exists p \in \mathbb{P} p \Vdash^* \text{op}(\check{x}, \check{b}) \in \tau\}.$$

We need to show $f : A \mapsto B$. Let $x \in A$ and $b \in M$ be such that $(\langle x, b \rangle \in f)^{M[\mathbb{G}]}$. Then $((\text{op}(\check{x}, \check{b}))_{\mathbb{G}} \in \tau_{\mathbb{G}})^{M[\mathbb{G}]}$, and, by VII 3.6, $\exists p \in \mathbb{P} (p \Vdash^* \text{op}(\check{x}, \check{b}) \in \tau)^M$, i.e. $b \in B$.

□

³The numbers "P7" and "P8" are from Hailperin's finite axiomatization of **NF**, see [3, p. 26].

Corollary 19 (see VII Exercise B6) Assume $\mathbb{P} \in M$ and α is an ordinal of M . Then (1) \Rightarrow (2), where

- (1) whenever $B \in M$, ${}^\alpha B \cap M = {}^\alpha B \cap M[\mathbb{G}]$;
- (2) ${}^\alpha M \cap M = {}^\alpha M \cap M[\mathbb{G}]$.

Proof. Assume (1). ${}^\alpha M \cap M \subset {}^\alpha M \cap M[\mathbb{G}]$ is obvious, so we need to show the converse. If $f \in {}^\alpha M \cap M[\mathbb{G}]$, then by Lemma 18 there is a $B \in M$ s.t. $f \in {}^\alpha B \cap M[\mathbb{G}]$. By (1) we have $f \in {}^\alpha B \cap M$, and, by transitivity of M , $f \in {}^\alpha M \cap M$. \square

VII 6.12. Definition. A poset \mathbb{P} is λ -closed iff whenever $\gamma < \lambda$ and $\{p_\xi \mid \xi < \gamma\}$ is a decreasing sequence of elements of \mathbb{P} (i.e., $\xi < \eta \rightarrow p_\xi \geq p_\eta$), then

$$\exists q \in \mathbb{P} \forall \xi < \gamma q \leq p_\xi.$$

Lemma 20 Assume \mathbb{P} is λ -closed and \mathbb{G} is \mathbb{P} -generic over M . Assume $y \in M[\mathbb{G}]$, $y \subset M$, $(|y| < \lambda)^{M[\mathbb{G}]}$. Then $y \in M$.

Proof. We have an $\alpha < \lambda$ and an $f: \alpha \xrightarrow{\text{bi}} y$ with $f \in M[\mathbb{G}]$. By VII 6.14, (1) of Corollary 19 is satisfied; consequently, so is (2). $f \in {}^\alpha M$, so by (2) $f \in M$, and thus $y = \text{ran}(f) \in M$. \square

Lemma 21 Assume \mathbb{P} is λ -closed and \mathbb{G} is \mathbb{P} -generic over M . Assume $\kappa_0 < \kappa_1$ and $\kappa_0 \leq \lambda$. Then $(\text{Fn}(\kappa_1, 2, \kappa_0))^M = (\text{Fn}(\kappa_1, 2, \kappa_0))^{M[\mathbb{G}]}$.

Proof. $(\text{Fn}(\kappa_1, 2, \kappa_0))^M \subset (\text{Fn}(\kappa_1, 2, \kappa_0))^{M[\mathbb{G}]}$ follows by absoluteness and $M \subset M[\mathbb{G}]$, so we need to show the converse. Let $p \in M[\mathbb{G}]$ and $(p \in \text{Fn}(\kappa_1, 2, \kappa_0))^{M[\mathbb{G}]}$. $\forall z \in p \exists x \in \kappa_1 \exists i \in 2 z = \langle x, i \rangle$, so $p \subset M$. We have $(|p| < \kappa_0 \leq \lambda)^{M[\mathbb{G}]}$, so by Lemma 20 $p \in M$. A bijection $f \in M[\mathbb{G}]$ between some $\alpha < \kappa_0$ and p is actually in M by VII 6.14, so that $(p \in \text{Fn}(\kappa_1, 2, \kappa_0))^M$. \square

Lemma 22 Assume \mathbb{P} is λ -closed and \mathbb{G} is \mathbb{P} -generic over M . Assume $\kappa_0 < \kappa_1$, $\kappa_0 < \lambda$, and \mathbb{G}_0 is $\text{Fn}(\kappa_1, 2, \kappa_0)$ -generic over M . Then \mathbb{G}_0 is $\text{Fn}(\kappa_1, 2, \kappa_0)$ -generic over $M[\mathbb{G}]$.

Proof. By VII 6.10, $\text{Fn}(\kappa_1, 2, \kappa_0)$ has the $(2^{<\kappa_0})^+$ -c.c. In $M[\mathbb{G}]$, $2^{<\kappa_0} = \kappa_0$, since $M \models \mathbf{GCH}$ and by VII 6.14 $M[\mathbb{G}]$ doesn't change powersets of

cardinals below λ . Therefore, in $M[\mathbb{G}]$, every $\text{Fn}(\kappa_1, 2, \kappa_0)$ -antichain has cardinality $\leq \kappa_0$.

Now let D be a dense subset of $\text{Fn}(\kappa_1, 2, \kappa_0)$ lying in $M[\mathbb{G}]$. We must show that \mathbb{G}_0 meets D . By Zorn's Lemma (applied in $M[\mathbb{G}]$) let A be a maximal antichain consisting of elements of D . Then A has cardinality at most κ_0 . By Lemma 20 A lies in M . A is clearly a maximal $\text{Fn}(\kappa_1, 2, \kappa_0)$ -antichain in the sense of M . But \mathbb{G}_0 is M -generic. So \mathbb{G}_0 meets A . Hence \mathbb{G}_0 meets D . \square

Corollary 23 *Under the conditions of Lemma 22, $\mathbb{G}_0 \times \mathbb{G}$ is $\text{Fn}(\kappa_1, 2, \kappa_0) \times \mathbb{P}$ -generic over M .*

Proof. Use the Product Lemma VIII 1.4. \square

Theorem 24 $G = \prod_{0 \leq i < n} G_i$ is $\mathbb{P} = \prod_{0 \leq i < n} \mathbb{P}_i$ -generic over M .

Proof. By backwards induction on j we prove that $\prod_{j \leq i < n} G_i$ is $\prod_{j \leq i < n} \mathbb{P}_i$ -generic over M . The claim is obvious for $j = n - 1$; so we assume it for j , $0 < j < n$, and try to prove it for $j - 1$. (We remind $\mathbb{P}_{j-1} = \text{Fn}(\sigma^j(\kappa), 2, \sigma^{j-1}(\kappa))$.) By Corollary 23, it's enough to see that $\prod_{j \leq i < n} \mathbb{P}_i$ is $\sigma^j(\kappa)$ -closed. Each \mathbb{P}_i is $\sigma^i(\kappa)$ -closed, see VII 6.13. It follows that each \mathbb{P}_i is $\sigma^k(\kappa)$ -closed if $i \geq k$, see VII 6.12. It follows that $\prod_{j \leq i < n} \mathbb{P}_i$ is $\sigma^j(\kappa)$ -closed, see Jech [6, 15.12]. \square

Finally, we arrive at

Theorem 25 *Strictly impredicative NF is consistent.*

Proof. Above. \square

2 Bonus P8

P8. k is an axiom

$$\exists v \forall x (x \in v \longleftrightarrow \exists y_1 \dots \exists y_k (\bigwedge_{1 \leq i, j \leq k; i \neq j} y_i \neq y_j \wedge x = \{y_1, \dots, y_k\})). \quad (17)$$

((17) asserts existence of a Frege natural number $k \geq 1$. Note that (17) is predicative and not strictly impredicative. The reasoning below also works for $k = 0$, when we understand \bigwedge_{\emptyset} as \top and \bigvee_{\emptyset} as \perp .)

That means that we must satisfy the following axiom of **TSTA**ⁿ:

$$\exists v^{i+2} \forall x^{i+1} (x \in v \longleftrightarrow \exists y_1^i \dots \exists y_k^i (\bigwedge_{1 \leq i, j \leq k; i \neq j} y_i \neq y_j \wedge x = \{y_1, \dots, y_k\})). \quad (18)$$

(Our formula $\varphi[x^{i+1}]$ in this case is " $\exists y_1^i \dots \exists y_k^i (\bigwedge_{1 \leq i, j \leq k; i \neq j} y_i \neq y_j \wedge x^{i+1} = \{y_1, \dots, y_k\})$ ".)

Given that

$$x^{i+1} = \{y_1^i, \dots, y_k^i\} \iff \bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq k} y_i^i \in x^{i+1} \wedge \forall u^i \in x^{i+1} \bigvee_{1 \leq i \leq k} u = y_i^i, \quad (19)$$

we see that the translation of (19), for $y_1, \dots, y_k \in \sigma^i(\kappa)$, $x \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa)$, is

$$\bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq k} y_i \in f_i(x) \wedge \forall u \in \sigma^i(\kappa) (u \in f_i(x) \rightarrow \bigvee_{1 \leq i \leq k} u = y_i),$$

i.e.

$$f_i(x) = \{y_1, \dots, y_k\}, \quad (20)$$

and in this case

$$\tilde{\varphi}(x, f_i) := \exists y_1 \in \sigma^i(\kappa) \dots \exists y_k \in \sigma^i(\kappa) (\bigwedge_{1 \leq i, j \leq k; i \neq j} y_i \neq y_j \wedge f_i(x) = \{y_1, \dots, y_k\}).$$

According to p. 11, in order to verify P8.k under our interpretation, we must have

$$A8.k := \{x \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa) \mid \exists y_1 \in \sigma^i(\kappa) \dots \exists y_k \in \sigma^i(\kappa) (\bigwedge_{1 \leq i, j \leq k; i \neq j} y_i \neq y_j \wedge f_i(x) = \{y_1, \dots, y_k\})\} \in M[G_{i+1}]. \quad (21)$$

(Note that $A8.k \in M[G_i] \subset M[G]$ automatically, because $f_i \in M[G_i]$ and $M[G_i]$ satisfies *Separation*, but what we actually need is $A8.k \in M[G_{i+1}]$.) Can we arrange for this?

What helps here is our special choice of f_i 's:

Claim 26 For $y_1, \dots, y_k \in \sigma^i(\kappa)$, $x \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa)$, $f_i(x) = \{y_1, \dots, y_k\}$ is equivalent to $x \in \sigma^i(\kappa) \wedge g_i(x) = \{y_1, \dots, y_k\}$.

Proof. \Leftarrow : Immediate from (9).

\Rightarrow : Let $a = \{y_1, \dots, y_k\} \in \mathcal{P}_{<\omega}(\sigma^i(\kappa))$. From (8), (3) and (9), $f_i^{-1}(b) = g_i^{-1}(b)$ for $b \in \mathcal{P}_{<\omega}(\sigma^i(\kappa))$ (f_i^{-1} enumerates $\mathcal{P}(\sigma^i(\kappa))$ in a special regular

way). From $f_i(x) = a$ we have $x = f_i^{-1}(a) = g_i^{-1}(a) \in \sigma^i(\kappa)$ (see (3)), so we must have $x \in \sigma^i(\kappa) \wedge g_i(x) = a$.

□

Summarizing (see (19)–(20)), we have proved

Lemma 27 *Under $y_1, \dots, y_k \in \sigma^i(\kappa)$, $x \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa)$, $(x = \{y_1, \dots, y_k\})^\sim$ is equivalent to a Δ_0 formula with parameters in M .*

—

Coming back to P8.k, the formula $\varphi_{8.k}[x^{i+1}]$ in this case is " $\exists y_1^i \dots \exists y_k^i (\bigwedge_{1 \leq i, j \leq k; i \neq j} y_i \neq y_j \wedge x^{i+1} = \{y_1, \dots, y_k\})^\sim$ ", and we must check that

$$\begin{aligned} A8.k &:= \{x \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa) \mid \tilde{\varphi}_{8.k}[x]\} \\ &= \{x \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa) \mid \exists y_1 \in \sigma^i(\kappa) \dots \exists y_k \in \sigma^i(\kappa) \\ &\quad (\bigwedge_{1 \leq i, j \leq k; i \neq j} y_i \neq y_j \wedge (x = \{y_1, \dots, y_k\})^\sim)\} \end{aligned}$$

is in $M[G_{i+1}]$. Lemma 27 actually gives us more: $A8.k \in M \subset M[G_{i+1}]$.

3 Bonus P7

P7 is an axiom

$$\forall u \exists v \forall x \forall y (\langle y, x \rangle \in u \longleftrightarrow \langle x, y \rangle \in v).$$

It follows by logic from

$$\forall u \exists v \forall z (z \in v \longleftrightarrow \exists x \exists y (z = \langle x, y \rangle \wedge \exists t \in u t = \langle y, x \rangle)).$$

In Type Theory, it is

$$\forall u^{i+3} \exists v^{i+3} \forall z^{i+2} (z \in v \longleftrightarrow \exists x^i \exists y^i (z = \langle x, y \rangle \wedge \exists t^{i+2} \in u t = \langle y, x \rangle)). \quad (22)$$

Thus, the formula $\varphi_7[z^{i+2}]$ in this case is

$$\exists x^i \exists y^i (z^{i+2} = \langle x, y \rangle \wedge \exists t^{i+2} \in u^{i+3} t = \langle y, x \rangle).$$

Then, under $u \in \sigma^{i+3}(\kappa)$, $z \in \sigma^{i+2}(\kappa)$, $\tilde{\varphi}_7[z]$ is

$$\exists x \in \sigma^i(\kappa) \exists y \in \sigma^i(\kappa) ((z = \langle x, y \rangle)^\sim \wedge \exists t \in \sigma^{i+2}(\kappa) (t \in f_{i+2}(u) \wedge (t = \langle y, x \rangle)^\sim)). \quad (23)$$

We must check

$$A7 := \{z \in \sigma^{i+2}(\kappa) \mid \tilde{\varphi}_7[z]\} \in M[G_{i+2}].$$

Lemma 28 Under $x, y \in \sigma^i(\kappa)$, $z \in \sigma^{i+2}(\kappa)$, $(z = \langle x, y \rangle)^\sim$ is equivalent to a Δ_0 formula with parameters in M .

Proof. A type-theory formula $z^{i+2} = \langle x^i, y^i \rangle$, under $x, y \in \sigma^i(\kappa)$, $z \in \sigma^{i+2}(\kappa)$, translates into

$$\exists u \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa) \exists v \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa) ((u = \{x, x\})^\sim \wedge (v = \{x, y\})^\sim \wedge (z = \{u, v\})^\sim),$$

i.e.

$$\exists u \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa) \exists v \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa) (f_i(u) = \{x, x\} \wedge f_i(v) = \{x, y\} \wedge f_{i+1}(z) = \{u, v\}),$$

which by (3) and (9) is equivalent to

$$\exists u \in \sigma^i(\kappa) \exists v \in \sigma^i(\kappa) (g_i(u) = \{x, x\} \wedge g_i(v) = \{x, y\} \wedge z \in \sigma^{i+1}(\kappa) \wedge g_{i+1}(z) = \{u, v\}).$$

□

By Lemma 28 all parameters in $(z = \langle x, y \rangle)^\sim$ and $(t = \langle y, x \rangle)^\sim$ in (23) may be assumed to be in $M \subset M[G_{i+2}]$; also we have $f_{i+2} \in M[G_{i+2}]$, so by *Separation* $A7 \in M[G_{i+2}]$.

4 Conclusion

Theorem 29 $\mathbf{NFSI} + \text{P8} + \text{P7}$ is consistent.

Proof. Above. See Theorem 25 and Sections 2 and 3. □

Surely more small additions to $\mathbf{NFSI} + \text{P8} + \text{P7}$ can be made to hold in $M[G]$ under the current interpretation, for example more axioms from Hailperin's list P1–P9 or from other finite axiomatizations of \mathbf{NF} . However, we don't think that *this* interpretation has any chances to reach full \mathbf{NF} . The consistency of \mathbf{NF} problem remains open.

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